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Global imbalances: the perspective 
of the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency
The problem of global imbalances has acquired disconcerting proportions. Surplus and deﬁ  cit countries must 
cooperate in a solution. Both emerging and advanced economies need to undertake structural changes. 
There is no exclusive domestic solution to global imbalances. Work must continue to restore ﬁ  nancial 
stability, involving supervision of global systemically important ﬁ  nancial institutions (G-SIFIs); reforming 
international institutions; dealing with destabilising capital ﬂ  ows into emerging economies; encouraging 
competition to the dollar in global currencies; and introducing asset targeting and macroprudential policy 
into the conduct of monetary policy. The current external surpluses of Saudi Arabia are a cyclical issue 
reﬂ  ecting its role in supplying oil to the global economy. Countercyclical ﬁ  scal policy is used to stabilise 
the growth path. Foreign exchange reserves act as a buffer and the exchange rate serves as the policy 
anchor while diversiﬁ  cation is pursued through capital investment.
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T
he 2007-08 ﬁ  nancial crisis has lent support 
to two facts: capital markets are closely 
interlinked around the world; and there 
is a visible connection between domestic and 
international ﬁ  nancial stability. 
This paper presents my perspective on global 
imbalances and financial stability. Section 1 
reviews the problem of global imbalances including 
suggestions on how to improve the situation. Section 2 
deals with ﬁ  nancial stability. Section 3 addresses the 




Imbalances in trade between economies are as old as 
trade itself, and normally they correct gradually so 
as to help the global economy move towards steady 
long-run growth. The problem of global imbalances 
has, however, acquired disconcerting proportions. 
This is due to a number of factors. First, the size of the 
imbalances involves the world’s leading economies, 
centring on the United States. Second, the problem is 
returning after some correction in 2008-09 (Table 1). 
Third, the global ﬁ  nancial system which ﬁ  nanced 
the imbalances (and helped exacerbate them by its 
creation of additional leverage) has been damaged by 
the crisis. Finally, there are issues of instability due 
to the imbalances within the euro area, which raise 
many of the same issues, in particular the difﬁ  culty 
of getting both surplus nations and deﬁ  cit nations 
to co-operate in ﬁ  nding an answer.
There are opposing views as to how to solve the 
problem. Emerging market (EM) economies with 
surpluses worry that advanced countries will use 
exports to reduce their imbalances at the expense 
of EM exports rather than address their structural 
problems. Advanced economies see the exchange 
rate of major EM economies as misaligned due to 
their export-led growth model. Many participants 
believe the cyclical surpluses of oil producers (which 
are quite different, as is argued in Section 3) to be 
somehow involved in the question.
In a globalised interdependent world, the pattern 
of imbalances cannot be “blamed” on any one 
party. The need of the hour is for all parties to take 
action and work together. The focus of discussions 
should be an orderly and gradual unwinding of the 
imbalances over the medium term while ensuring 
that broad-based global expansion continues. But we 
need a common vision of where the world economy 
should be going as well as agreement on policy 
instruments. The rise of the developing economies 
is the biggest change. It has accelerated as a result 
of the crisis and the developing world will shortly 
account for over half of the world’s gross domestic 
product (GDP) on a purchasing power parity (PPP) 
basis. Structural reform programmes (including for 
global institutions) need to recognise this. 
1|2  Challenges for rebalancing 
global demand
Any answer which focuses only on ﬁ  xing the US deﬁ  cit 
runs the risk of a 1930s-type trade depression as 
aggregate demand is withdrawn from the world 
economy. But correcting the surpluses solely by 
expanding domestic demand in surplus nations risks 
igniting global inﬂ  ation as in the 1970s. Both creditors 
(surplus nations) and debtors (deﬁ  cit nations) need 
to take concerted action. Restoring balance to the 
world economy involves stronger demand in the 
euro area and a continuation of domestic demand 
expansion in Japan. Additional efforts to increase 
competition in the markets for goods and services, 
and to improve labour market ﬂ  exibility, are needed 
in these economies to safeguard the recovery that 
is taking place.
The United States must take action to correct its ﬁ  scal 
deﬁ  cit and to prevent a recurrence of a credit-driven 
boom which was ultimately dependent on the health 
of housing collateral. We cannot expect a change in 
Table 1
Current account balances of the major economies
(USD billions)
2007 2008 2009 2010
Forecast
United States -718 -669 -378 -466
Japan 211 157 142 166
Germany 254 245 163 200
China 372 436 297 270
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook, October 2010.
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the exchange rate of the US dollar vis-a-vis currencies 
of surplus countries to solve the problem on its own: 
it is not a panacea. Experience shows that exchange 
rate changes have very limited short-run effects on 
current account positions. Furthermore, attempts 
to model the extent of the US dollar depreciation 
needed to bring US exports and imports into balance 
show that not even a major fall in the currency can 
bring this about in the short term. There are other 
factors, such as rigidities in demand elasticities, 
differences in economies of scale and cost structures 
across economies that may mitigate or even negate 
the effects of exchange rate changes. However, for 
some countries, exchange rate ﬂ  exibility can be a 
part of the solution in the conduct of their ﬁ  scal and 
monetary policies.
For their part, EMs are moving beyond the traditional 
export-led growth model. As their economies become 
larger and more integrated into international trade 
and ﬁ  nance, they face an increasingly complex set 
of policy challenges, which demand institutional 
ﬂ  exibility. Large external surpluses are symptoms 
of deeper structural imbalances domestically 
(i.e. a growing gap between savings and investment). 
But many EM economies have relatively 
underdeveloped ﬁ  nancial markets and institutions 
and low per capita incomes; wealth and access to 
credit lag far behind those of advanced industrial 
economies. This puts constraints on the effectiveness 
of standard macroeconomic policies.
As for domestic demand in EMs, gross savings rates 
are much higher in emerging economies compared 
to advanced economies at 32% vs 18% of GDP in 2010 
(source: International Monetary Fund – IMF), and 
consumption is accordingly lower. There are serious 
obstacles to stimulating consumption in EMs: 
investment in services is low, and the retail and 
ﬁ  nancial sectors are underdeveloped. Transport and 
power networks serve the needs of manufacturing 
rather than consumers. Consumer items are mostly 
locally produced (China’s imports of consumer goods 
accounted for only 3% of global imports in 2008). 
However, consumption is growing rapidly although 
from a low base. As Chart 1 shows, consumption growth 
in EMs is about 8% this year and the IMF estimates that 
private domestic demand will contribute two-thirds 
of Chinese growth in 2010 and 2011. But structural 
reforms are needed to unlock the consumer demand 
that is undoubtedly there: for instance, given the young 
demographics and lower life expectancy in EMs, there 
is a huge potential demand for better education and 
improved health care. However, many EMs apply an 
oligopolistic model to restrict private competition, and 
so restrict the supply of these services, with the result 
that the pent-up demand cannot be satisﬁ  ed.
Despite their constraints, EMs should undertake ﬁ  scal, 
ﬁ  nancial sector and labour market reforms to achieve 
more balanced growth. This is in their own interests 
as well as that of the world economy. Lasting gains in 
competitiveness can best be secured through deepening 
structural reforms. Policies to improve the climate for 
business should be helpful in addressing this issue. 
Domestically-led growth can crucially be helped by a 
healthy and dynamic banking system, so that ﬁ  nancial 
and banking sector reforms are also needed.
1|3  Protectionism stiﬂ  es growth
Unprecedented global imbalances have again stirred 
policy debate at the recent Fund/Bank annual meeting 
in October 2010 and raised fears of competitive 
devaluation and overt or hidden protectionism. 
Fortunately, most G20 members believe that it 
is short-sighted to hike trade barriers or oppose 
competition-friendly reforms in sectors that compete 
with imported goods and services, because such 
actions have a meagre impact on improving terms 
of trade. In fact, world economic growth would be 
stiﬂ  ed and global imbalances unresolved. 
Chart 1
Consumption in emerging and advanced economies
Real private consumption (annualised percent change 




















Source: IMF World Economic Outlook, October 2010.
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Erecting barriers against the free ﬂ  ow of international 
finance would be dangerous at the moment. 
Measures such as capital restrictions may work in the 
short-term but they create more problems further out. 
The complexity of issues calls for coordinated action 
and a spirit of cooperation rather than unilateral 
action and/or confrontation over policies. There is 
no exclusive domestic solution to global imbalances. 
Gradualism should be the way forward to resolve 
inefﬁ  ciencies in factors contributing to the prevailing 
problem (i.e. exchange rates, capital ﬂ  ows, ﬁ  scal 
slippages, etc.).
2| FINANCIAL STABILITY IN THE WAKE 
OF THE FINANCIAL CRISIS
2|1 Background
The recent ﬁ  nancial crisis has exposed weaknesses 
in the functioning of the international monetary 
system. Pressure for reform of the IMF and other 
international institutions had been growing 
hand-in-hand with concerns over global imbalances 
even before the crisis. Now reform of banking 
regulation has joined the list, and growing dispersions 
in economic recovery and policy actions make it 
more urgent than ever to take action. The major 
issues are reviewed below. 
2|2  Restoring ﬁ  nancial stability
It is broadly agreed that progress is needed in 
a number of areas:
•  Bankers will need to continue with rigorous stress 
tests of bank balance sheets.
 
• Financial regulators have to press ahead with 
a carefully-sequenced introduction of reforms as 
the recovery continues.
• Global  systemically-important  financial 
institutions (G-SIFIs) need to have more ability to 
absorb losses than less critical banks, and must be 
more tightly regulated on a cross-border basis.
•  Accounting rules have to be harmonised globally.
•  Central bankers need to integrate a macroprudential 
dimension into their policy.
• Governments must anchor fiscal policy in 
a credible medium-term framework that addresses 
debt sustainability concerns (i.e. they must plan to 
run primary surpluses).
• Economists need to rethink their model-based 
approaches that gave no warning of the crisis.
G-SIFIs are an issue that needs to be tackled as soon 
as practicable. EU and US regulators need a common 
approach on how to deal with a failing bank. 
In its recent report to the G20 Seoul summit, the 
Basel Committee stated it will not complete a study 
on how much additional loss absorbency G-SIFIs 
need to have until mid-2011.
2|3  Reform of international institutions
As world economic power shifts from the G7 
towards EMs, operational arrangements (in the 
IMF in particular) need to reﬂ  ect this in order 
to operate effectively. The agreement at the G20 
ﬁ  nance ministers’ and central bank governors’ 
meeting in Korea for the IMF reform is a welcome 
development. When the comprehensive review of 
the quota formula takes place by January 2013, there 
should be a formula to continue such rebalancing. 
A mechanism for realigning votes in line with shares 
of world GDP will ensure that these institutions 
retain their crucial coordinating role in world affairs 
and avoid being sidelined. In return, the developing 
world must commit to provide the necessary capital 
resources, and to make the institutions work 
productively.
As the nature of the recent global credit crisis 
warranted a global response, the G7 has been 
expanded to G20 to address the complex issues, which 
include regulatory reforms, crisis resolution and 
global rebalancing. The G20 forum has so far proven 
to be effective in restoring normalcy to the markets 
and bringing the world economy back into recovery 
from a severe recession. 
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2|4 Capital ﬂ  ows
The highly volatile nature of capital flows has 
complicated the conduct of monetary policy. 
This is particularly true of global banking ﬂ  ows which 
swung round from USD 451 billion net lending to EMs 
to a net withdrawal of USD 44 billion between 2007 
and 2009 –turnaround of nearly half a trillion dollars 
(see Table 2). 
There are both positive and negative effects of 
capital ﬂ  ows but in EMs the size of the swings is 
destabilising and the most-needed component is 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), which is the most 
stable. Large inﬂ  ows of ‘hot money’ complicate 
monetary policy, leading to controls through taxation 
or minimum holding periods. Asset price bubbles 
also tend to contribute to imbalances by creating a 
false perception of wealth. In the Middle East and 
North Africa (MENA) region, speculative inﬂ  ows 
to support property speculation caused problems 
when they abruptly reversed during the ﬁ  nancial 
crisis after 2007. 
All traditional options for dealing with capital ﬂ  ows 
have problems for EMs:
•  Exchange rate appreciation or lower interest rates 
in pegged regimes: as capital ﬂ  ows swing around, 
this could lead to foreign exchange volatility and 
interest rates becoming hostage to foreign ﬂ  ows rather 
than being appropriate for domestic conditions.
• Reserve accumulation via sterilised foreign 
exchange (FX) intervention: this can be self-defeating 
(as rising interest rates attract more capital). 
Unsterilised reserve accumulation can be also ﬁ  scally 
expensive as it can result in inﬂ  ation. Size of ﬂ  ows 
can overwhelm FX intervention.
• Tighter fiscal policy may result in delaying 
infrastructure projects and there are political and 
economic limits as strong ﬁ  scal or external positions 
can attract more inﬂ  ows.
As macroeconomic policies may not be enough to deal 
with massive inﬂ  ows of foreign capital, the toolkit 
has to include other instruments. Strengthening the 
prudential framework (credit control, countercyclical 
capital requirements, capital control and/or direct 
or indirect tax) can help mitigate the adverse 
consequences of surging capital inﬂ  ows. Capital 
controls are not the answer on their own:
•  They are difﬁ  cult to administer. 
•  They can be circumvented in the short-run.
•  Their effectiveness appears to decrease over time.
However, under exceptional circumstances, 
a well-structured time-bound capital control 
programme could help mitigate adverse implications 
of excessive portfolio inﬂ  ows into the EM economies, 
particularly when FX reserves are adequate, the 
exchange rate is not undervalued and the economy 
is not overheating. 
 
Development of a strong domestic ﬁ  nancial system that 
reduces reliance on loans from global banks (historically 
the most volatile ﬂ  ows) and encourages local savings 
ﬂ  ows is the best long-run answer. When EM savers 
seek diversiﬁ  cation or do not ﬁ  nd safe and efﬁ  cient 
opportunities within local capital markets, savings ﬁ  nd 
their way primarily into the United States by virtue of 
its provision of sound and liquid ﬁ  nancial instruments. 
Developing ﬁ  nancial instruments in EMs will help 
contain global imbalances. It is encouraging to note 
that local currency bond markets have been growing in 
the last few years. For example, Latin American bond 
markets now show a local currency share of over 70% 
in bond issuance (2008 data). However, even a sound 
domestic ﬁ  nancial system can be affected by a global 
liquidity crisis when local banks suddenly ﬁ  nd their 
external funding lines have been cut because G-SIFIs 
are in trouble.
2|5 Reserve  currencies
The dollar plays three distinct roles in the 
international monetary system as a unit of account 
(numeraire), a medium of exchange and a store of 
Table 2
Sources of global ﬁ  nancing to emerging economies
(USD billions)
2007 2008 2009 2010
Forecast
Bank lending 451 29 -44 85
Equity investment -13 -105 78 97
Foreign direct 
investment 333 299 152 156
Source: Institute of International Finance.
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value for investors (this has become more important 
as the United States has the most liquid and diversiﬁ  ed 
asset markets). It is not practical to talk of replacing 
the dollar with Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) or any 
other basket of currencies, given the limitations of 
baskets in terms of their availability and application 
in private use. The SDR, for instance, is a claim on a 
basket of currencies but not a currency itself. SDRs 
constitute about 4% of global reserves and there are 
few investment opportunities in SDRs. 
However, the global economy faces a structural 
currency issue in that ‘Trifﬁ  n’s Dilemma’ means 
the United States must supply an increasing volume 
of liquidity to support the growth of world trade. 
World trade will continue to grow faster than both 
the world economy and the US economy, and this 
dilemma will become more marked. Unchecked, 
the natural result is a long-term decline in the dollar 
exchange rate. In the short-term, the temptation 
is for the United States to let the dollar fall freely. 
A pragmatic approach is to introduce competition 
in global currencies. The prospect of having more 
competition for the dollar would be healthy for 
US macroeconomic policy and for the world economy.
The euro at present is potentially such a currency 
and as euro asset markets develop, it will become 
more attractive as a store of value. Other prospective 
currencies can be brought in at a later stage, reﬂ  ecting 
the importance of their role in the global economy 
and ﬁ  nancial markets. The yen and the yuan stand 
a good chance to be in the major league of reserve 
currencies along with the dollar and the euro. SDRs 
could well be an add-on. 
EM countries (in particular, China) which aspire to 
the role will need to open up their domestic asset 
markets further to foreigners and provide a wide 
range of liquid traded instruments to attract investors. 
But the goal of a multipolar reserve currency structure 
is worth pursuing. 
2|6  Implications of recent events 
for monetary policy
Recent events have exposed limitations in the conduct 
of monetary policy. Inﬂ  ation targeting is not enough 
to provide a workable macroeconomic framework 
for sustaining growth in the advanced economies. 
The “one-tool one-target” approach of using policy 
rates to target CPI inﬂ  ation proved to be irrelevant 
when the crisis broke. Arguably, it even contributed 
to the crisis in that its apparent success led to 
complacency whereby bankers believed rates would 
always stay low, therefore justifying more leverage.
Inﬂ  ation targeting was not practical in most emerging 
economies. The most pressing challenge for 
EM central banks is the volatile nature of capital ﬂ  ows, 
which interferes with monetary policy. Additionally, 
fiscal dominance makes monetary policy more 
difﬁ  cult, especially where the need to manage public 
debt resulting from structural budget deﬁ  cits conﬂ  icts 
with price stability and ﬁ  nancial stability objectives. 
The crisis has highlighted two challenges. First, we 
need to have a more sophisticated understanding of 
how asset price bubbles develop so that we can use 
the tools of monetary policy more effectively against 
them. Second, we also need additional measures to 
preserve ﬁ  nancial stability.
ASSET PRICE TARGETING
It is now quite obvious that asset price inﬂ  ation 
and bubbles cannot be ignored by central banks. 
The recent crisis has made it clear that markets are 
not ultimately self-correcting and banks need to be 
strongly supervised. The ﬁ  nancial system presents 
a unique danger to the economy as a whole because it 
is the supplier of credit. If the supply of credit becomes 
excessive, it will drive asset prices upwards until a 
crisis occurs (caused by over-leverage). Central banks 
have historically worried that they would be criticised 
for misjudging asset price valuations, and that they 
were well-positioned to react after the bubble has 
burst. This was not the case in 2007-08 as the zero 
bound in policy rates was quickly reached, ﬁ  scal 
policy had to be brought in to help, and central banks 
had to resort to untried and unconventional measures. 
The consequences of not acting when asset prices 
appear to rise unsustainably are extremely serious, 
amounting to risks to the entire ﬁ  nancial system and 
the health of the global economy. The crisis has led to a 
diagnosis, which would have been unacceptable before:
•  Central banks should take action in “leaning against 
the wind” by using monetary policy to dampen 
unjustiﬁ  able rises in asset prices even when there 
is no immediate risk of inﬂ  ation.
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•  The root cause of crises is bankers’ behaviour and 
positive ﬁ  nancial regulation must replace ‘light touch’ 
regulation.
•  Individual bank regulation must be complemented 
by an overview of ﬁ  nancial stability. 
MACROPRUDENTIAL MEASURES
Authorities (whether bank regulators or central 
banks) will have to augment prudent monetary policy 
with macroprudential actions.The Basel III proposals 
in fact blend macroprudential policy with traditional 
measures of capital adequacy. In particular, 
implementing counter-cyclical rules governing 
capital requirements should be the judgment of the 
central bank. 
Basel III focuses on the problems of banking 
systems in advanced economies and may damage 
traditional banking activities in EMs, such as trade 
credit ﬁ  nancing. There are severe challenges for 
macroprudential policies in some EMs:
•  Government institutions are often weak, vulnerable 
to political pressure and coordinating policy is difﬁ  cult.
•  There is a lack of good sources of information about 
the detailed operation of the economy. Government 
statistics are produced late and are often of poor quality.
•  Bank balance sheets are opaque. Banks are often 
state-owned or controlled and often lend on political 
criteria.
• Even when local regulators act prudently and the 
banking system is well-capitalised, external events can 
overwhelm the capacity of local regulators to inﬂ  uence 
events when the global banks withdraw funds.
Monetary policy and ﬁ  nancial stability are two sides 
of the same coin. Monetary policy cannot be effective 
if the banking system is weak. Policies to pursue 
ﬁ  nancial stability are just as important as targeting 
the exchange rate or inﬂ  ation. In Saudi Arabia, 
supervision of banks and conduct of monetary 
policy are both carried out by SAMA, and this is 
an arrangement that has served the economy well. 
SAMA has always been proactive in ensuring ﬁ  nancial 
stability by introducing prudential guidelines and 
tightening credit criteria at a time when credit was 
easily accessible globally. Saudi banks have sufﬁ  cient 
buffers to safeguard the interest of their shareholders 
and the economy. 
3| THE CASE OF SAUDI ARABIA
3|1 Background
First of all, it should be noted that there is a problem 
resulting from the different ways that current account 
balances are aggregated in current discussion, which 
masks the true picture of imbalances. But taking the 
last ten years of historical data ending in 2009, the 
cumulative sum of the current account surpluses of 
Germany, the Netherlands and Switzerland was larger 
than the surpluses of all the OPEC members. Comparing 
Germany alone with the four Gulf OPEC members 
(Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar and United Arab Emirates) 
for the last decade, Germany ran a cumulative 
surplus of USD 1,176 billion which was larger than 
the USD 1,088 billion surplus for Gulf OPEC members 
taken together (source: IMF World Economic Outlook). 
The surpluses of the oil-exporting economies of 
the Gulf with limited economic diversity, such as 
Saudi Arabia, are not only overstated as a problem; 
they are fundamentally different from those of other 
countries in two ways. First, they result from the 
production of a single commodity with a limited 
lifespan. Second, they represent a cyclical and not 
a structural issue for the world economy. 
3|2  The challenges of oil revenues 
for ﬁ  scal and monetary policy
FISCAL POLICY
Oil prices today in real terms are not far out of line 
with historical values, as Chart 2 shows.
The supply of oil to the world economy can adjust 
in only a limited way in the short term to changes 
in demand and as a result it is highly volatile. This is 
because of the long lead time and large capital 
investment required for new supplies of oil to be 
discovered, brought on stream and processed into 
usable product. Increased production by countries 
such as Saudi Arabia prior to the crisis was necessary 
FSR15_01_12_AL-JASSER.indd   7 FSR15_01_12_AL-JASSER.indd   7 04/02/2011   16:16:19 04/02/2011   16:16:19Global imbalances and ﬁ  nancial stability
8  Banque de France ￿ Financial Stability Review ￿ No. 15 ￿ February 2011
Global imbalances: the perspective of the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency
Muhammad Al-Jasser
to bring about moderation in the oil price for the sake 
of world economic growth. This combination of high 
prices and increased production has produced the 
surpluses, which were used during the recent crisis 
for ﬁ  scal stimulus.
The volatility and inherent unpredictability of all 
commodity prices is a well-established fact as is 
demonstrated in Chart 3.
The swings in revenues that result are a cyclical 
phenomenon reﬂ  ecting the health of the global 
economy. Unlike the surpluses of exporters of 
manufactured goods, they are not structural. 
Domestically, the extremely large swings from 
external surplus to deﬁ  cit and back again are reﬂ  ected 
in the domestic ﬁ  scal balance due to the dominant 
role which oil revenues play in public ﬁ  nances.
The fluctuations which the Saudi economy has 
experienced in the last thirty years, partly as 
a consequence of its moderating role in the oil market, 
are unwelcome and destabilising. After the surpluses 
of the 1970s, Saudi Arabia remained a deﬁ  cit country 
from 1983 to 2002 (with the exception of 2000). 
Since 2003, there has been a budget surplus (exception 
being 2009) as shown in Chart 4.
Saudi Arabia has accomplished a large reduction in 
the ratio of domestic debt to GDP (see Chart 5).
Chart 2













1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Notes: Real prices are expressed in 1982-84 USD terms. Last observation for real 
prices refers to May 2010 and for nominal prices to June 2010.
Sources: ECB, Global ﬁ  nancial data, BLS.
Chart 3
Prices of selected primary products
2000-2010




































Source: WTO using IMF primary commodity prices.
Chart 4
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Source: Central Department of Statistics and Information, Ministry of Economy 
and Planning.
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In short, Saudi Arabia’s ﬁ  scal policy faces a challenging 
balancing act: meet the increasing demands on the 
budget as a result of demographic pressures while 
saving enough of the oil wealth to be able to pursue a 
countercyclical stance and preserve intergenerational 
equity. This prudent ﬁ  scal policy has served Saudi Arabia 
well. In particular, it has enabled Saudi Arabia to limit 
the impact of the global ﬁ  nancial crisis on its economy 
and support the ongoing economic recovery while 
preserving long-term ﬁ  scal sustainability.
MONETARY POLICY
The policy anchor is the ﬁ  xed exchange rate regime 
(the Riyal peg has not moved since 1986), which gives 
certainty to investors in an area where capital ﬂ  ows 
are predominantly in dollars and allows interest rates 
to track US rates with a small premium. In addition, 
conﬁ  dence in the peg allows domestic banks cost 
effective access to external borrowing (i.e. lower 
risk premium) and adds certainty to terms of debt 
repayments. Trade and ﬁ  nancial transaction costs 
are minimised. Oil and gas are priced and paid for in 
dollars and the bulk of imports are priced in dollars. 
Reserve management flexibility is not affected 
provided the ‘cushion’ of FX reserves accumulated 
during good times is maintained at an acceptable 
level when external deﬁ  cits occur.
It is often argued that a ﬂ  exible exchange rate would 
help address the surpluses of oil exporters. In the 
case of Saudi Arabia, the theoretical advantage of 
a ﬂ  exible exchange rate does not accrue because of 
the composition of the export and import sectors. 
This can be understood by taking the example of a 
falling currency, which should in theory stimulate 
exports and growth. Exports of Saudi oil are, however, 
priced in the world market in dollars. Devaluing 
the Riyal will not stimulate exports of oil, and other 
export areas are very small. Oil revenues would be 
higher in local currency terms. But this advantage 
would be largely offset by the higher cost of imports 
and the result would be a higher price level with little 
gain to growth or employment. Similarly, gains from 
revaluation are doubtful.
A recent example of policy debate was in 2006-07 over 
whether Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) members 
should adjust the dollar peg upwards (at a time when 
the dollar was soft) or adopt a basket approach at 
a time of imported inﬂ  ation. In May 2007, Kuwait 













reportedly heavily dollar-weighted. At that time, 
Saudi growth was still rapid against a background 
of strong oil demand. But revaluation was rejected 
because it would not have slowed down the export 
sector nor affected growth, which was driven by oil 
revenues. Imports would have become cheaper but 
the resultant wealth effect for consumers might well 
have aggravated inﬂ  ation by increasing domestic 
demand. Some commentators argued that high 
real interest rates would have curbed inﬂ  ation but 
this argument does not hold in Saudi Arabia where 
consumers are not heavily borrowed and the ratio of 
bank credit to GDP is modest (see Chart 6).
Furthermore, the bulk of the inﬂ  ation hike was linked 
to food price and rental rate hikes (supply shocks). 
The most powerful tool was to run large budget 
surpluses to dampen demand. 
PRUDENTIAL BANK REGULATION
Despite criticism of its conservatism, SAMA continues 
to encourage banks to maintain a capital cushion far 
in excess of the required minimum capital adequacy, 
a conservative liquidity ratio in the form of liquid assets 
at no less than 20% of bank deposits, loan/deposit ratio 
ceiling guideline at 85% and dynamic provisioning so 
that the system stays resilient in any crisis.
This approach helped cushion the impact of the global 
crisis on Saudi Arabia, but Saudi banks suffered from 
the abrupt withdrawal of funds from the region by the 
global banks, and were affected by the rise in credit 
spreads. Saudi Arabia has no bank that is ‘too big to fail’ 
and SAMA intends to fully apply the counter-cyclical 
buffer to the banks. Saudi banks are not likely to be 
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impacted by the new Basel III rules, given the fact that 
their capital is predominantly in the form of common 
equity and retained earnings, and is far above the 
minimum required under Basel III. Furthermore, 
new liquidity and stable funding requirements under 
Basel III are unlikely to have any meaningful impact 
on Saudi banks’ liquidity ratios as their balance sheets 
are relatively liquid reﬂ  ecting the diversiﬁ  ed asset 
composition of short-term instruments, loans and 
marketable securities.
In April 2010, Standard and Poor’s characterised Saudi 
banks’ capital (ranging from adequate to solid) as a 
supportive rating factor, as “these banks carry sizable 
capital cushion to absorb unexpected losses,” and it 
has been upgrading Saudi banks this year. This is a 
tribute to the fact that ﬁ  nancial stability through the 
health of the banking system has always been the 
authorities’ focus of attention. 
LONG-TERM INVESTMENT PROGRAMME
It is difﬁ  cult to understand why oil exporters should 
be seen as part of the problem of global imbalances 
when the oil price is not in their control. The ratio of 
current account balance to GDP shows the volatility 
in this data (see Chart 7).
The focus should be on the prudent use of surpluses 
to put resource-based economies on a sustained path 
of growth. In Saudi Arabia, there is an ambitious 
structural reform agenda to improve growth led by 
the private sector, achieve economic diversiﬁ  cation 
and strengthen public ﬁ  nances. Increased spending 
on infrastructure, and in particular on health and 
education, has led to a considerable boost to domestic 
demand and to growth. In addition, public ﬁ  nances 
have been strengthened and there is ongoing progress 
in structural reform.
The main thrust of Saudi Arabia’s reforms in the 
last few years has been to develop the production 
base of the economy by creating an atmosphere 
conducive to both domestic and foreign investment. 
Laws relating to investment have been updated, 
and necessary institutional reforms carried out. 
Administrative and legal procedures have been 
strengthened. One result has been a signiﬁ  cant rise 
in FDI. FDI inﬂ  ows accounted for 43% of capital 
formation in 2009, and the stock of FDI is equivalent 
to 40% of GDP. Saudi Arabia now ranks 17th out of 
141 countries in terms of inward FDI performance 
according to UNCTAD data (see Table 3).
Capital spending is focused on modernising and 
expanding the infrastructure of the economy, and 
raising the production capacity for oil. Production 
capacity of crude oil has been raised to 12.5 million 
barrels per day. Reﬁ  ning capacity expanded by 
about 30% between 2005 and 2009. Other mega 
projects are under way in physical infrastructure 
(such as a railways network), petrochemicals, 
electricity, gas and water, telecommunications and 
IT, tourism, agriculture, education and training. 
In the 2005-2009 ﬁ  ve year plan, these projects 
cost over USD 200 billion, an increase of 60% 
on spending under the previous plan. However, 
there are undoubtedly limits to the pace at which 
Saudi Arabia can prudently increase its spending. 
The experience of the oil boom of the 1970s was that 
Table 3




2006 2007 2008 2009
FDI (USD billion) 1.5 17.1 22.8 38.1 35.5
As % of gross ﬁ  xed 
capital formation 4.4 na 29.9 46.0 43.5
FDI stock 
as % of GDP
12.0 na 19.2 23.9 40.5
Country ranking 
by inward FDI 
performance index 
(of 141 countries) – – 55 33 17













1990 1992 1994 1996 1998
Source: SAMA.
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bottlenecks emerged in the physical economy when 
spending was increased too rapidly (absorptive 
capacity constraints). Furthermore, there must be 
hurdle rates for the productive return from any 
project, and the economy will not beneﬁ  t from 
projects which fail to achieve these rates of return.
In summary, Saudi Arabia has contributed to the health 
of the global economy during the crisis in three ways:
• meeting additional demand for oil, mainly from 
EMs, so reinforcing the global recovery;
• contributing to activity overseas by importing 
infrastructure-related capital goods;
•  supporting many developing economies 
through workers’ remittances (which rose from 
USD 15.7 billion in 2007 to USD 25.2 billion in 2009). 
These remittances are the second largest source 
of global remittances (after the United States) and 
are powerful tools in lifting families out of poverty. 
The remittance/GDP ratio is about 6.8% 
in Saudi Arabia.
All the economies involved in the pattern of structural global imbalances must work together to resolve the 
problems in a medium term framework. Surplus and deﬁ  cit countries must cooperate to make sure the world 
economy does not fall into another serious recession through lack of demand in deﬁ  cit countries, and to avoid 
the inﬂ  ation that would result if surplus countries expanded demand without action elsewhere. Structural 
improvements to improve the trend growth rate are needed in the United States, the euro area and Japan.
There is a need to address the pressure points in current arrangements, which are preventing effective 
international action to deal with the biggest ﬁ  nancial institutions. There is a worry that complacency 
may set in about the need for positive bank regulation, control of leverage, misuse of credit ratings and 
the unrestrained spread of complex products. There has to be a full recognition of the right of emerging 
economies to occupy their legitimate position and say in the world economy and international ﬁ  nancial 
institutions. Reserve currencies should evolve in a competitive manner reﬂ  ecting their economies and the 
state of ﬁ  nancial markets. The move from G7 to G20 in global ﬁ  nancial governance is a good start but we 
must intensify efforts towards achieving a consensus on ways of establishing a durable ﬁ  nancial order.
The importance of ﬁ  nancial stability cannot be overemphasised. Central banks are faced with a serious 
challenge of managing both price and ﬁ  nancial stability. Monetary policy, which has its own limitations, has 
been given too much credit for the “golden age” of rapid growth and low inﬂ  ation. Monetary policy cannot 
be used to change the growth rate of the economy in the medium term, but it can help create a more stable 
supply of credit and bank lending, and so reduce volatility in the growth path of the economy. This is a shift from 
targeting (which was not suitable for EMs anyway) to a more pragmatic and nuanced approach to monetary 
policy. In fact, ﬁ  nancial stability is needed for growth, which in turn sustains macroeconomic stability. In today’s 
globally integrated markets, it is more important than ever for central banks and other ﬁ  nancial authorities to 
share information, minimise regulatory arbitrage and take a common interest in crisis management actions.
FX reserve accumulation in emerging economies is a buffer against shocks and volatility, but the surpluses 
of oil exporters are different in kind from the structural surpluses that have accumulated in other economies. 
Saudi Arabia has few comparative advantages outside the hydrocarbons area and must always consider 
the trade off between keeping oil in the ground and using oil revenues productively. Saudi Arabia’s large 
surpluses partly result from its role in stabilising the oil market and restraining further oil price rises that 
might derail global growth. The swings in the domestic economy that have resulted from this role are in 
many respects unwelcome, but the scope for a different policy is limited. Any change in currency regime 
would make matters more difﬁ  cult by increasing economic volatility without stimulating exports, and there 
are limits to the extent to which Saudi Arabia can accelerate its economic development programme. 
As ﬁ  nancial stability is key to effective monetary policy transmission, SAMA takes a proactive approach 
in supervising Saudi banks through rule-based as well as macroprudential approaches.
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